University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Presentations, Working Papers, and Gray
Literature: Agricultural Economics

Agricultural Economics Department

August 2007

Shifting From a Price Safety Net to a Revenue Safety Net
Bradley Lubben
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, blubben2@unl.edu

Troy J. Dumler
Kansas State University

G. Art Barnaby
Kansas State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ageconworkpap
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons

Lubben, Bradley; Dumler, Troy J.; and Barnaby, G. Art, "Shifting From a Price Safety Net to a Revenue
Safety Net" (2007). Presentations, Working Papers, and Gray Literature: Agricultural Economics. 25.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ageconworkpap/25

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Presentations, Working
Papers, and Gray Literature: Agricultural Economics by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.

Issued August 21, 2007

Shifting From a Price Safety Net to a Revenue Safety Net
Prepared by:
Bradley D. Lubben, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
and
Troy J. Dumler and G. Art Barnaby, Jr., Kansas State University

In late July, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of
2007, or the “2007 Farm Bill,” to reauthorize farm, food, and other agricultural programs for
2008 through 2012. This culminated more than two months of discussion in the House
Agriculture Committee and subcommittees and reflected much of the policy direction
championed by committee chair Collin Peterson of Minnesota.
In the Senate, the agricultural committee under Chairman Tom Harkin of Iowa has yet to begin
formal consideration of the 2007 Farm Bill. However, given some comments from Senator
Harkin, there are some elements of the House-passed version that could show up in an eventual
compromise that would mean changes in the basic mechanics of farm commodity programs.
One of the potential changes is a shift from a federal farm income safety net based on price to
one that is in part based on revenue. Specifically, the House has proposed a revenue-based
counter-cyclical payment (revenue CCP) as an alternative to the current price-based CCP. The
revenue-based program would add yield to the safety net calculation and would make a payment
to participating producers when the combination of national average yield and national average
price produced a revenue calculation that fell below a target established in the legislation. The
target for each program crop was set at the product of the five-year Olympic-average national
yield times the adjusted target price as used for the existing price CCP (and as amended in the
proposed language). Any shortfall below this target for each crop would be paid out on
participating base acres for the respective crop, after adjusting for differences in farm versus
national average CCP yield levels and accounting for payment on only 85 percent of base acres
as with the existing direct and CCP programs.
This revenue CCP would be offered as an optional alternative to the current price CCP. Thus, in
the same manner as the 2002 Farm Bill sign-up process, producers would have to make a onetime decision as to whether to sign-up for the revenue- or price-based program. The decision and
the program would not affect the direct payment or the marketing loan part of the federal farm
income safety net. The direct payment program would remain unchanged and the marketing loan
would stay intact, with a few adjustments in loan rates from the current program. The marketing
loan would continue to provide price protection below the loan rate and would be the lower
bound on the price factor used in the revenue CCP, the same as currently exists for the price
CCP.
Building part of the farm income safety net on a revenue CCP instead of a price CCP looks
appealing to producers because revenue more directly affects the bottom line for producers than
price. It also looks appealing to policymakers concerned about budget costs because the

variability of revenue should be less than the variability of price alone since price and yield are
negatively correlated at the national level. As a result, the total payments may be reduced while
maintaining the safety net assistance in years of most concern.
However, there are also many questions about how a revenue program will work that will test
how attractive the new policy direction looks to producers. The first is the level of protection
actually provided by the safety net. With current higher price levels and forecasts for continued
strength in most farm program commodities, the price and revenue CCP would both kick in at
levels substantially below current expectations. At a proposed target revenue of $344.12 per acre
for corn, the revenue CCP safety net would be only about 69 percent of the current expected
revenue, using baseline projections for 2008 of $3.22 per bushel and 155.1 bushels per acre. By
comparison, the price CCP would continue to kick in at $2.35, which is 73 percent of the same
$3.22 price expectation.
The numbers suggest that there is less chance of payments under the revenue CCP than under the
price CCP. Table 1 compares how the price and revenue CCP programs would have performed
over the last thirty years based on actual market prices and trend-adjusted yields. For all four
crops considered, the price CCP triggered payments more often, but sorghum was the only crop
in which the average price CCP payment was significantly larger than the revenue CCP payment.
Corn was the only crop that had larger average revenue CCP payments. The revenue CCP
triggered payments less frequently, but payments were often larger than price CCP payments
when they were triggered.
Table 1. Comparison of Price and Revenue CCP Options for U.S. Crops Based on TrendAdjusted Yields and Market Prices (1977-2006).
Comparison Measure

Wheat

Corn

Soybeans

Sorghum

PCCP Avg Payment ($/ac)

$10.05

$12.80

$4.25

$5.76

PCCP Frequency of Payment

73.3%

50.0%

33.3%

53.3%

PCCP Avg Paid Payment ($/ac)

$13.71

$25.61

$12.75

$10.80

$9.63

$14.43

$3.88

$1.96

RCCP Frequency of Payment

70.0%

46.7%

30.0%

23.3%

RCCP Avg Paid Payment ($/ac)

$13.76

$30.91

$12.93

$8.41

RCCP Avg Payment ($/ac)

In the end, which CCP alternative would be most attractive to producers is not immediately clear.
As proposed, the revenue CCP would not kick in as quickly as the price CCP, but it would make
larger payments once it does kick in. And, the revenue CCP would pay for revenue losses due to
price and yield, covering a greater degree of risk than the price CCP. However, neither program
seems likely to make large payments on the major Midwestern program crops if the current
market outlook remains for the life of the farm bill. In addition, while the revenue CCP
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potentially offers a better design for risk management protection, calculating it at the national
level takes out only some of the systemic risk in production and marketing and not the
idiosyncratic, or distinct, individual, risk.
An alternative revenue CCP proposal introduced in the Senate by Dick Durbin of Illinois and
Sherrod Brown of Ohio may serve as a marker in the Senate farm bill discussions to replace both
the current price CCP and also the current marketing loan program. This alternative would
establish a moving revenue target based on 90 percent of the trend yield at the state level
multiplied by a three-year moving average national price. After actual state yields and national
prices are determined, any shortfall below the revenue target would be covered by the revenue
CCP. The actual revenue CCP paid to a farm would equal 90 percent of the shortfall multiplied
by the quotient of the farm’s actual production history divided by the state expected trend yield to
adjust for productivity (and expected revenue) differences between farms.
This proposal also leaves several questions to the interpretation. The use of a state-level revenue
target is potentially much more appealing than a national-level revenue target because of the
likely higher correlation of farm yields to state yields instead of national yields. But, the potential
performance of the program is still very much related to the factors used in the calculations. The
expected yield for each year is based on the trend yield curve estimated from 1980 to 2006. For
some crops in some states, the trend yield over that time period has not trended upward very
much. Whether it is due to multi-year weather problems bringing down yields at the end of the
period or whether it reflects changing production patterns and cropping systems that have
changed the average productivity of land devoted to each crop, it affects how high the safety net
is and how much of a risk management tool it provides.
The three-year moving average price also means the safety net gradually tracks the market. Thus,
it is designed more as a risk management tool than as an income support tool as passed in the
House. Even with the moving average and a limit on changes from year to year, a multi-year
swing in prices, either higher or lower, could substantially change the level of the safety net
relative to long-run expectations. That could make the program relatively expensive if market
prices drop from their current levels in the next few years. Conversely, it could make the safety
net less effective if producers face a multi-year trough in price levels, such as occurred in the
1998-2001 period.
One other issue with a revenue-based safety net is its relation to crop insurance coverage. The
House-passed version does not address any linkage with crop insurance, although a national-level
revenue safety net does appear to be a very weak substitute for crop insurance. The DurbinBrown bill in the Senate proposes a state-level trigger that would be a better substitute for farmor county-level crop insurance products currently on the market. As such, it is formally linked
with crop insurance, such that any payments received under the revenue-based CCP would
reduce any payments received on crop insurance for the crop on the farm. The goal here is not to
eliminate the role of crop insurance, but to pass part of the systemic risk covered by crop
insurance to the revenue-based CCP. If effective, the resulting crop insurance policy should be
3

better able to isolate and cover just the idiosyncratic risk on the farm and as a result, be a
cheaper, more affordable product that may also be more actuarially sound.
The final product of deliberations on the 2007 Farm Bill are far from complete. In fact, at this
stage of the process, it is not entirely clear whether the new farm bill will be finished in time to
call it the 2007 Farm Bill. But, it does appear that some new policy alternatives will work into
any eventual product, including a gradual shift to revenue-based support. While the concept is
appealing from a risk management perspective, there will be numerous issues in terms of how the
program is defined and implemented. The level of aggregation (e.g. state versus national) and the
level of protection relative to expectations impacts the effectiveness of the program as a risk
management tool for producers. The moving average safety net implies more risk protection and
less income support than with the fixed safety net. The level of integration of the revenue-based
CCP with the existing safety net, including both marketing loans and insurance programs, is
critical if the overall safety net is to provide an effective risk management package for producers.
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